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Abstract
In recent years, Reichenbach’s 1920 conception of the principles of coor-
dination has attracted increased attention after Michael Friedman’s attempt
to revive Reichenbach’s idea of a “relativized a priori”. This paper follows
the origin and development of this idea in the framework of Reichenbach’s
distinction between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connec-
tion. It suggests a further differentiation among the coordinating axioms
and accordingly proposes a different account of Reichenbach’s “relativized
a priori”.
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1 Introduction
In the years he spent in Istanbul, between 1933 and 1938, Reichenbach was mainly
engaged in providing a more solid framework for the probabilistic picture he had
started delineating in his doctoral dissertation of 1915, namely a probabilistic
logic for scientific thought.1 These years are also characterised by his final attempt
to refute the synthetic a priori, when he coined the pregnant expression “disaggre-
gation (de´sagre´gation) of the a priori” to describe the movement of ideas that
led to the birth of logical empiricism.2 Nonetheless, nowadays one of his most
discussed, and certainly most interesting, contributions is considered to be the
original proposal of a synthetic (or constitutive) yet revisable a priori, which he
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first formulated in his 1920 “Habilitation” thesis on relativity theory and cognition
a priori.3
In this work, which deals with the possibility of reconciling Einstein’s theory
with the Kantian system, the notion of constitutive a priori appears to be tied to a
view of the cognitive coordination (Zuordnung) that is in general traced back to
the influence of Moritz Schlick’s General Theory of Knowledge (1918). In fact,
in the secondary literature, it is largely accepted that Reichenbach first proposed a
peculiar version of the synthetic a priori—and its correlated concept of cognitive
coordination—only after his encounter with relativity theory, in the years 1917–
1920.4 As Friedman puts it,
[i]t is in no way accidental that coordination as a philosophical
problem was first articulated by scientific philosophers deliberately
attempting to come to terms with Einstein’s general theory of rela-
tivity. Indeed, Reichenbach in 1920, together with Moritz Schlick in
virtually contemporaneous work, were the first thinkers explicitly to
pose and to attempt to solve this philosophical problem. [Friedman
(2001), 78]
The aim of the present paper is to discuss neither Friedman’s proposal of a
relativized a priori, nor the way he used it to ground his dynamical conception
of the scientific development and its related philosophy from Newton to Einstein.
Rather, it is to analyse and clarify Reichenbach’s conception of cognitive coor-
dination in his early works in order to show that what he had in mind was more
sophisticated than usually suggested and was also crucially linked with the role he
assigned to probability in scientific representation.
A philosophical framework for the notion of coordination, as functional corre-
lation between a concept and its object, was indeed first provided by Reichenbach
not with respect to the theory of relativity, and not primarily in line with Schlick’s
1918 conception, but against a totally different background, namely probabilistic,
in his doctoral dissertation of 1915, The Concept of Probability in the Mathemat-
ical Representation of Reality.5 The fact that the issue of coordination makes its
first appearance in such a framework is important in that the core of the relativized
a priori is to be found, in nuce, in his doctoral thesis, not in his monograph on rel-
ativity theory. Moreover, as we shall see, Reichenbach’s concept of Zuordnung
is mainly inspired by the one Cassirer elaborated in his “Kant und die moderne
Mathematik” (1907) and in Substance and Function (1910).
In the next section, I will briefly sketch some of the features of Reichenbach’s
first work on probability and emphasise that this was the real ground of his move
away from Kant, focussing on the specificity of his formulation of coordination.
In section 3, I will consider the way this notion is imported into his “Habilitation”
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thesis, where it turns into the distinction between axioms of coordination and
axioms of connection. Finally, in section 4, I will present some developments
related to this distinction that Reichenbach considered right after the publication
of his 1920 book and that imply a different reading of his relativized a priori.
These developments are prior to the well-known correspondence with Schlick of
the end of November 1920, which has in general been deemed the principal cause
of Reichenbach’s adoption of a “conventionalist” viewpoint. In my view, two
levels of constitutivity can be identified in his original proposal, along, so to speak,
a vertical axis, as I suggest in the last section. This allows for an interpretation
that regards his later shift towards conventionalism as only partial.
2 Elements of an Attempted “(Neo-)Kantian” Pro-
posal
2.1 Coordination in the Dissertation. Or: From Mathematics
to Physics (via an Account of Approximations)
Reichenbach’s doctoral thesis initiated a reflection on the principles of causal-
ity and probability that he was bound to develop over the course of his entire
intellectual life.6 In his first work, Reichenbach emphasised the importance of
these two fundamental principles of knowledge, which appear to be compatible
and whose validity is traced back to their status as synthetic a priori principles in
the traditional Kantian fashion.7 In this work, the importance of the principle of
probability is crucially linked with that of the principle of causality, which in 1915
Reichenbach still considered as complemented by the principle of probability.
Following Kant, Reichenbach views the physical laws as describing (causal)
connections among natural phenomena. These connections can be conceived, and
are indeed justified, only by virtue of a synthetic a priori principle: the princi-
ple of causality, here also called “the principle of the lawful connection” (Prinzip
der gesetzma¨ssigen Verknu¨pfung). Physical laws are expressed in mathematical
terms. The application of mathematical laws entails their coordination to empiri-
cal quantities, as represented in the physical equations. However, these quantities
are never as exact as the quantities that enter into pure mathematics because they
are scattered around certain values that need to be estimated. In this respect, the
values that occur within physical laws are “fictions” in the sense that they do not
mirror reality perfectly but merely with a certain, possibly high, degree of accu-
racy. Every physical law (every causal assertion) presupposes a neglect of certain
perturbing factors that are ineliminable from the observation. Since there are an
infinite number of such factors, it is impossible to determine their precise values.
3
Therefore, we have to make some hypothesis concerning the behaviour of these
perturbations and their frequency.
The idea is as follows. Our measurements are in principle imprecise. The
measured values should represent the algebraic sum of an infinity of influential
quantities, but for practical reasons, we have to consider them as the sum of finite
factors, which we can use to calculate “backwards” the sought quantity. Our di-
rect measurement, explains Reichenbach, never points to the real quantity that we
are supposed to find, but only to its function. In this sense, the resulting numerical
value is the one that we have chosen as representative for the class of available
measured values. So the problem is that of being able to determine which of these
values is the “correct” one. In other words, we have to find a lawful procedure
to ground the choice among these various possibilities. This procedure is repre-
sented by a mathematical law expressing the errors distribution, a law that will
“assign a frequency to every error.”8 This is the role played by the other funda-
mental synthetic a priori principle, which Reichenbach defines as the “principle
of the lawful distribution” (Prinzip der gesetzma¨ssigen Verteilung), i.e., the prin-
ciple of probability. This principle asserts that each empirical distribution has a
convergence limit, and it warrants (via a “transcendental” justification)9 that the
observed convergence in the empirical distribution actually is representative of
the “true” probabilities. This should finally enable us to formulate the physical
laws, therefore making possible a prediction. Thus, Reichenbach’s principle of
probability is meant to complete Kant’s principle of causality.10
It is in this context that Reichenbach first uses the concept of coordination to
express the idea that the content of physical knowledge requires some specific
form of coordination of certain mathematical structures to objects of empirical
intuitions. Whereas the objects of mathematical judgments can be fully grasped,
the objects of physical judgments require the coordination of the former to the
unformed reality in order to produce the latter. In doing so, Reichenbach implicitly
underlines that—the methodical Kantian assertion concerning the applicability
of mathematics to the physical world notwithstanding—this coordination is in
principle not complete, as we cannot do without approximations: a stance which
is quite far from the Kantian spirit.11
In the coordination of the mathematical structures to real ones required by
physics (as well as by any empirical science), an important part is therefore played
by the approximations with which we have to deal when we want to lay out nat-
ural laws. The values that appear within physical equations never stand for the
measured values, which merely approximate the “real” ones (those which indeed
satisfy the equations): hence, the crucial importance of probability in natural sci-
ences. Physical knowledge, Reichenbach writes,
consists in the coordination of equations, and consequently of
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numbers, to classes of objects of empirical intuition. The equality
of these numbers for a number of actual objects of the class cannot
be asserted, but only the approximate equality. The reason for this
approximation is the existence of a law for the distribution of values.
While mathematical judgments determine variables in such a way that
they are the same for all their individual objects in all places at all
times, the variables in a physical judgment are not equal for all indi-
vidual objects in their class, but rather subject to a law of distribution
in space and time. Instead of the general validity of mathematical
claims, we have in the case of physical judgments the subsumption
under the law of distribution. [Reichenbach (1916/2008), 127]
In Reichenbach’s doctoral thesis, physical (but, in general, any empirical)
knowledge puts forward an assertion about the validity of the coordination of a
specified mathematical structure to reality. Thereby, with respect to the Kantian
tradition, the question of validity is raised around two axes. On the one hand, the
legitimacy of physical claims depends on our capacity to deal with the approxima-
tions rendered necessary by the shortcomings inherent in judgments of reality. On
the other hand, the existence of such a function is itself justified from a transcen-
dental viewpoint and it is explained, so to speak, bottom-up from the considera-
tion of the empirical observations, to which this function must conform. In other
words, mathematical judgments, according to Reichenbach—and differently from
Cassirer, as we shall see in the next subsection—although being synthetic a priori,
acquire a meaning for cognition only insofar as they are consistently applied to re-
ality. Above all, the role of mathematical syntheses appears somewhat secondary
to the “imposition” determined by experience on the choice of the mathematical
structures that are supposed to represent it.
To a certain extent, what Reichenbach is considering here is a two-step “con-
structional” interpretation, in which the two levels, the set of formal assumptions
and the set of empirical (approximated) data, cooperate in order to form a solid
ground for scientific knowledge.12 An echo of this issue will be clearly rever-
berating in the idea of the mutuality of the coordination, a central element of his
1920 formulation to which we shall return below. Let us first consider the impact
of Cassirer’s conception of Zuordnung on Reichenbach’s thought.
2.2 Cassirer’s Influence
After the scientific—especially mathematical—developments of the nineteenth
century, critical philosophy was confronted with a different form of objectivity.13
In a paper of 1907, “Kant und die moderne Mathematik,” and more extensively
in the volume Substance and Function of 1910, Cassirer set out to clarify the
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new task of critical inquiry, that of accounting for the lately transformed manner
of concept formation (Begriffsbildung), and providing a new logic of objective
knowledge.
In his 1910 monograph Cassirer, starting from an analysis of the evolution of
modern mathematical natural sciences, and inspired by the new logicist currents in
the foundations of mathematics, proposed a theory of the concept built on purely
formal notions of function, series and order (or order system). Intuition, down-
played in favour of concept, takes part in the process of knowledge only once
it is unified by pure thought. This unification can be understood as a subsump-
tion under a system of relations and functional dependencies that is similar to the
mathematical construction of concepts and series, and ordered accordingly. Each
element of the series is constituted by the relation it bears to the other members of
the series to which it is coordinated, while, at the same time, each is meaningfully
correlated to members of other series. This network of dependencies and func-
tional relations is grounded on this peculiar notion of coordination as constitutive
of objects.14
Cassirer interpreted the historical development of mathematics and the math-
ematical sciences of nature according to a “genetic” conception of knowledge, as
a generative progression of abstract structures (or “order systems”) converging to-
wards a merely regulative ideal: the achievement of rational completeness of the
conditions for the possibility of experience.15 In this framework, critical philos-
ophy becomes a “universal invariant theory of experience,” for it ideally aims at
identifying the ultimate logical invariants (the real a priori) “which lie at the basis
of any determination of a connection according to natural law.”16 In the transition
towards new stages of knowledge, Cassirer clarifies,
it is the “functional form” itself, that changes into another; but
this transition never means that the fundamental form absolutely dis-
appears, and another absolutely new form arises in its place. The
new form must contain the answer to questions, proposed within the
older form; this one feature establishes a logical connection between
them, and points to a common forum of judgment, to which both are
subjected. The transformation must leave a certain body of princi-
ples unaffected; for it is undertaken merely for the sake of preserving
this body of principles, and these reveal its real goal. Since we never
compare the system of hypotheses in itself with the naked facts in
themselves, but always can only oppose one hypothetical system of
principles to another more inclusive, more radical system, we need
for this progressive comparison an ultimate constant standard of mea-
surement of supreme principles of experience in general. [. . . ] The
goal of critical analysis would be reached, if we succeeded in isolating
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in this way the ultimate common element of all possible forms of sci-
entific experience, i.e., if we succeeded in conceptually defining those
moments, which persist in the advance from theory to theory because
they are the conditions of any theory. At no given stage of knowl-
edge can this goal be perfectly achieved; nevertheless it remains as
a demand, and prescribes a fixed direction to the continuous unfold-
ing and evolution of the system of experience. [Cassirer (1910/1923),
268–269]
In Cassirer’s early works, a pivotal position is assigned to mathematics for
its specificity in exhibiting the very fundamental intellectual syntheses on which
sciences rest, as displayed by their historical succession. Thus, mathematical con-
cepts have a crucial philosophical significance in that they allow for a lawful order-
ing of phenomena, and for assigning them objective meaning. This fact assumes
an even deeper importance once it is made clear that the critique of knowledge
takes off precisely where mathematical reasoning stops, namely by elucidating
the role that mathematical concepts play in constructing our “objectual” reality
(“gegensta¨ndliche” Wirklichkeit).17
Reichenbach openly builds on Cassirer’s general approach in Substance and
Function, where the most distinctive feature of scientific thought is that of pro-
ceeding according to a scheme of progressive dissolution of the concept of sub-
stance into that of function. As we have seen, for Cassirer the role of functions is
that of constituting the objects of scientific representation through the connecting
relation provided by the laws—a relation due to which each thing is mutually con-
nected to every other. Reichenbach’s probability function plays a similar role in
the representation of reality for it enables the connection that is described by the
laws of nature. Further, following Cassirer, Reichenbach places an emphasis on
the essential function performed by certain theoretic components (the constants)
within and relative to a specific construction—constitutive elements that will be-
come simple variables in the successive stage of scientific evolution.18 As he
explains,
[e]very constant is presented as a function; the natural constant
which is simply given for certain laws and to whose measurement
several experiments are dedicated is brought into connection with
completely different quantities, so that it appears as a function whose
specific value in the previous laws is only attained under special cir-
cumstances. [. . . ] This is the general approach of physics: to resolve
constants into functions, to find more general laws that contain the
previous law as a special case. No end of this process is in sight.
[Reichenbach (1916/2008), 115]
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Along with Cassirer and the Marburg tradition, Reichenbach’s doctoral thesis
takes as a starting point science in its actuality and regressively tries to reconstruct
its conditions of possibility, in line with the transcendental method presented in
Kant’s Prolegomena. It is this same idea that will be at the core of Reichenbach’s
wissenschaftsanalytische Methode, the inductive method of logical analysis of sci-
ence that he will more fully elaborate in his “Habilitation” thesis.19 This method
should implement the identification of the actual principles presupposed by empir-
ical sciences. It essentially represents the tool for detecting contradictions when
comparing sets of coordinating principles (with their corresponding laws of na-
ture) belonging to two different systems, one of which has developed from the
other. Reichenbach will show the inconsistency of the Kantian System with the
Einsteinian one precisely making use of this regressive approach.
Most interestingly, in his “Habilitation” thesis these remodeled Cassirerian
elements cooperate to shape a crucial, explanatory strategy that appears under
the name of “procedure of the continuous expansion” (Verfahren der stetigen Er-
weiterung).20 The idea is that the inclusion of the old theory into the new one
occurs as a generalisation of certain principles of knowledge—more specifically,
coordinating principles constituting the actual concept of knowledge—that have
become inconsistent with the old system. Contradictions can emerge and a gen-
eralisation (or extension) of a determinate system can also be obtained within the
system itself, by virtue of this specific procedure. As he elucidates in 1920,
[t]he contradiction that arises if experiences are made with the old
coordinating principle by means of which a new coordinating prin-
ciple is to be proved disappears on one condition: if the old prin-
ciple can be regarded as an approximation [Na¨herung] for certain
simple cases. Since all experiences are merely approximate laws
[Na¨herungsgesetze], they may be established by means of the old
principles; this method does not exclude the possibility that the to-
tality of experiences inductively confirms a more general principle.
It is logically admissible and technically possible to discover induc-
tively new coordinating principles that represent a successive approx-
imation of the principles used until now. We can call such a gener-
alization “successive” [stetig] because for certain approximately re-
alised cases the new principle is to converge toward the old princi-
ple with an exactness corresponding to the approximation of these
cases. We shall call this inductive procedure the method of successive
approximations [Verfahren der stetigen Erweiterung]. [Reichenbach
(1920/1965), 68–69]
These are all motifs that Reichenbach inherited from Cassirer, although de-
prived of the regulative, ideal dimension in which they were embedded. Inciden-
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tally, this is a decisive element in Reichenbach’s 1920 book, for the absence of
this dimension could well imply a move towards realism. In fact, in an account
of a progressive generalisation of principles, there are two possible directions to
take: either take a stance towards a form of dynamical idealism, as is the case
of Cassirer (and somewhat of the 1920 Reichenbach), or take a step towards re-
alism, a position that Reichenbach will explicitly embrace for the first time in
“Metaphysics and Natural Science” (1925a). The roots of this shift can be seen in
the nuanced difference that there is between Reichenbach and Cassirer in assign-
ing or not assigning a regulative meaning to the approximated generalisation of
principles in the progress of science.
Thus, it is clear that Reichenbach intends his early interpretation of Zuordnung
to stay in line with that of his teacher.21 Nonetheless, in Reichenbach’s doctoral
thesis the direction of the coordination is not only that of taking the mathemati-
cal structures and casting them onto the empirical material, almost assigning, as
it were, the order from above, as it appears in Cassirer’s work. As I mentioned
above, in Reichenbach’s interpretation the empirical sphere plays the crucial role
of imposing the range of possible values and “controlling” the adequacy of the
function through the given empirical frequency observed in the single case, and
from there applied to the class which it belongs to. To accentuate the interesting
difference with respect to the Kant-Cassirerian tradition Reichenbach intends to
adhere to, let us recall that in Cassirer’s paper of 1907 the mathematical syntheses
provide the ground for using the physical ones. Mathematics, there, grants the
lawfulness of physics, whereas here it is the physical considerations themselves
that select and warrant that a certain mathematical structure is applicable to real-
ity. This takes place only by accepting (pace Kant) the constitutively imperfect
character of the coordination of the mathematical sphere to the physical one. In
other words, although Reichenbach does not extend this discussion further, the
relations of primacy are the reverse in the two accounts. We shall soon see how
this idea will be fruitfully strengthened in his 1920 monograph.
3 Elements of a Revised “Kantian” Proposal
3.1 Mathematical vs. Physical Coordination
The declared aim of The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge is the revi-
sion of the Kantian doctrine of the a priori in light of the theory of relativity. Along
the same direction undertaken in the doctoral thesis, Reichenbach elaborates fur-
ther on the issue of coordination, but now integrating Hilbert’s axiomatic model.22
In set theoretic language, he explains that the difference between mathematical
and physical coordination depends on the difference between the mathematical
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and the physical types of concept. The former is “univocally determined by the
axioms and definitions of mathematics,” i.e., it is implicitly defined through its re-
lation to the other mathematical concepts so that it “receives meaning and content
within the framework of definitions.”23 Definitions, in fact, indicate how a term
is to be related to the others, whereas the rules according to which concepts are
defined are given by axioms. The latter, however, cannot be determined by axioms
and definitions. Whatever system of mathematical equations we may create and
use to represent physical events, it will lack a fundamental statement, that is, the
assertion concerning the validity of that system for reality.
This fact implies a decisive asymmetry in the two types of coordination, pre-
cisely as Reichenbach underlined in his (1916). But in the 1920 account, there is
a new element that he acquires after reading Schlick’s General Theory of Knowl-
edge (1918): the concept of univocality (Eindeutigkeit). In the mathematical coor-
dination both coordinated sets are wholly and univocally (eindeutig) determined
in their terms and internal order. According to Reichenbach, the peculiarity of the
coordination carried out in the cognitive process is that, when the set of well de-
fined fundamental equations of physics is coordinated to the empirical matter, we
have to face the very fact that one side of this coordination is not defined; neither
can we define the direction of the coordination. As Reichenbach makes clear,
the defined side does not carry its justification within itself; its
structure is determined from outside. Although there is a coordination
to undefined elements, it is restricted, not arbitrary.24 This restriction
is called “the determination of knowledge by experience.” We notice
the strange fact that it is the defined side that determines the individual
things of the undefined side, and that, vice versa, it is the undefined
side that prescribes the order of the defined side. The existence of
reality is expressed in this mutuality of coordination. [Reichenbach
(1920/1965), 42]
Similarly to that of mathematical coordination, a criterion of univocality for
physical coordination is introduced. We can deem a physical theory true when it
leads to a consistent coordination, that is, when the coordination is univocal (or
empirically confirmed). To characterise cognitive coordination as univocal means
indeed that “a physical variable of state is represented by the same value resulting
from different empirical data.” In this account, perceptions provide the required
criterion.25 Furthermore, univocality is also essential for the consideration of a
system of principles as a whole when compared to reality, as we shall see below.
The revised critical question now becomes: what principles allow for univo-
cality? Reichenbach’s answer is that Kant’s system can be modified and made
compatible with the evolution of science only by changing his doctrine of the a
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priori and by determining which principles of the coordination are the new ones,
and what their new function is.
3.2 Two Meanings of A Priori and the Distinction between Ax-
ioms of Coordination and Axioms of Connection
As is well known, in The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge Reichen-
bach proposes an interesting version of the a priori—the so-called “relativized
a priori”26—that he views as divided according to its two components: “First it
means ‘necessarily true’ or ‘true for all times,’ and secondly, ‘constituting the
concept of object.’”27
Although the theory of relativity has shown the indefensibility of the first com-
ponent, in 1920 Reichenbach still supported the second form of synthetic a priori
as a constitutive element of knowledge in general, but revisable according to the
evolution of science. Thus, again following an idea expressed by Cassirer, Rei-
chenbach emphasised that “a priori” means “before knowledge,” but not “for all
time” and not “independent of experience.”28 Hence, he gave an interpretation
of the cognitive coordination as based on contingent, coordinating principles that
we need to presuppose in order to form, or constitute univocally, the objects of
(scientific) knowledge—more specifically, in this case, the objects of physics. All
these principles (including probability and causality) are constitutive a priori, yet
nevertheless fallible, and theory-specific.
One of the most interesting features of this little but very rich monograph is the
repetition and re-elaboration of the distinction between the principle of the lawful
distribution (probability) and the principle of the lawful connection (causality),
which Reichenbach introduced in his doctoral thesis. Now this differentiation is
presented in the form of a distinction between certain principles of knowledge
called the axioms of coordination (Zuordnungsaxiome) and the axioms of connec-
tion (Verknu¨pfungsaxiome), where only the first ones are truly constitutive, even
though contingently.29
In 1920, Reichenbach sketched an axiomatic conception of physics by stating
a sharp distinction between these two types of axioms—a distinction that will
later fall victim to his crucial shift from (constitutive) principles of coordination
to (conventional) coordinative definitions. This shift followed a famous exchange
with Moritz Schlick in autumn 1920, at the end of which Reichenbach was urged
to accept the conventional nature of his constitutive principles.30
The axioms of connection are the empirical laws of physics, the fundamental
equations of a theory. Reichenbach gets the term “Verknu¨pfungsaxiome”, which
can be traced back to Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie, from the interpretation
presented in an article by Arthur Haas (1919).31 There, Haas describes the history
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of the physical axiomatisation as an evolution in the direction of a more unitary
image of nature, that is, an evolution in terms of a wider connection (Verknu¨pfung)
created by the laws within different fields. In this respect, formulating new phys-
ical laws means disclosing previously unseen connections.32 Consequently, Rei-
chenbach considers the axioms of connection as empirical laws in the usual sense,
involving already sufficiently well defined concepts. Yet, as we have seen, the
concepts in such equations require further qualification, viz., the assertion that
they are valid for reality. It is only through the axioms of coordination that how
these concepts can de facto apply to reality can be shown. And that is precisely
their role: providing a “physical” definition of the concepts occurring within the
axioms of connection. In that sense, the former determine the meaning of the lat-
ter and they are therefore constitutive of the concept of the physical object. Thus,
the axioms of coordination determine the rule of the application of the axioms of
connection to reality, that is, they determine the rules of the connection.
Finally the axioms of coordination are required in order to state the univocal
coordination of these concepts to reality. In Reichenbach’s words:
Although [the coordinating principles] are prescriptions for the
conceptual side of the coordination and may precede it as axioms of
coordination, they differ from those principles generally called ax-
ioms of physics. The individual laws of physics can be combined into
a deductive system so that all of them appear as consequences of a
small number of fundamental equations. These fundamental equa-
tions still contain special mathematical operations; thus Einstein’s
equations of gravitation indicate the special mathematical relation of
the physical variable Rik to the physical variables Tik and gik. We shall
call them, therefore, axioms of connection. The axioms of coordina-
tion differ from them in that they do not connect certain variables of
state with others but contain general rules according to which con-
nections take place. In the equations of gravitation, the axioms of
arithmetic are presupposed as rules of connection and are therefore
coordinating principles of physics. [Reichenbach (1920/1965), 54]
Additionally, they must also be of such kind that they make the coordination uni-
vocal. Even if there are arbitrary elements in the principles of knowledge, their
combination is no longer arbitrary. This is a crucial point, Reichenbach maintains,
that had not been sufficiently accounted for by the conventionalists.33
Having said all this, however, the question remains whether among the axioms
of coordination there are some that are more significant, or, to put it differently,
whether there are principles that are “more constitutive” than others.
Coordinating principles refer to the conceptual side of the coordination, and
are purported to define what is real. Reichenbach indicates a non-exhaustive list
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of principles, like time and space, because they allow for the definition of a single
real point by means of four numbers.34 Other important axioms of coordination
are the principle of genidentity (or identity over time) and the principle of proba-
bility. This last principle is the variant of the principle of the lawful distribution
that we encountered above and that is relativized, being still constitutive but re-
visable. This principle now simply “defines when a class of measured values is to
be regarded as pertaining to the same constant.”35 The other principle is one that
occurs for the first time in Reichenbach’s writings, with an expression, geniden-
tity, that was officially coined by the gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1922.36
Of this principle Reichenbach only says that it indicates how physical concepts
have to be connected in sequences in order to define “the same thing remaining
identical with itself in time.”37 For example,
[w]hen we speak of the path of an electron, we must think of the elec-
tron as a thing remaining identical with itself; that is, we must make
use of the principle of genidentity as a constitutive category. This
connection between the conceptual category and the experience of
coordination remains an ultimate, not as an analysable residue [nicht
analysierbarer Rest]. But this connection clearly defines a class of
principles that precede the most general laws of connection as pre-
suppositions of knowledge though they hold as conceptual formulas
only for the conceptual side of the coordination. These principles are
so important because they define the otherwise completely undefined
problem of the cognitive coordination. [Reichenbach (1920/1965),
55]
What is striking in this account of the coordinating principles is the fact that
even though Reichenbach does not provide a detailed account of all these axioms,
he does not seem to assign them the same significance. These last two principles
in particular hold a pivotal position and play a more fundamental role with respect
to the other coordinating axioms. Probability and genidentity are both indeed
required by all other coordinating axioms that we use to assign content to the
concepts occurring in the connecting axioms. The values appearing within the
equations receive their physical meaning by virtue of the coordinating axioms, but
the act of measuring itself is primarily dependent upon the principle of probability,
as well as, more generally, on the principle of genidentity. These two constitutive
axioms are, so to speak, meta-axioms of coordination: they are constitutive of
the constitutive axioms, in that they represent an essentially underlying level of
constitutivity, as I will argue more in detail in 4.1.
The distinction between connecting and coordinating axioms has been un-
derstandably regarded as a very striking version of the relativized a priori.38 In
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The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, this distinction serves well as
a foundation for the outline of a model of scientific change, that is, of the evo-
lutionary transformation in the concept of knowledge and the consequent shift
in the logical conditions presupposed by the new object of physical knowledge.
To illustrate how the advance from theory to theory takes place in light of these
two types of axioms, Reichenbach uses the example of the metric. In Newtonian
physics, he explains, the Euclidean metric was a coordinative axiom because it
determined “the relations according to which space points combine to form ex-
tended structures independently of their physical quality.” In Einstein’s physics,
on the contrary, the metric becomes a function of the totality of other surround-
ing bodies. Thus, Reichenbach concludes, “the metric is no longer an axiom of
coordination but has become an axiom of connection.”39
4 Further Developments in 1920
4.1 Coordinating Properties, Not Just Structures
The distinction between axioms is a key element in the framework of this mono-
graph, but unfortunately Reichenbach does not go into it more thoroughly. To be
sure, The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge was conceived and written
in only a few days in the spring of 1920.40 The manuscript, entirely available
at the Pittsburgh Archives, was ready for publication, with minor modifications,
during the summer of 1920. This material makes it clear that the distinction be-
tween axioms in these terms was inserted only later in revisions. Interestingly, in
the drafts of this work there are traces of another specification in a marginal note,
added later but eventually omitted from the published version. With respect to the
passage that I have quoted above, p. 12, in this note he writes:
The specific laws can be combined into a deductive system so that
all of them appear as consequences of a few fundamental equations.
We will call these equations axioms of connection because they ex-
press the connection between the specific physical magnitudes. Op-
posite to these are the axioms of coordination, which represent the
properties of all bodies, reduced to a minimum of propositions. An
example of coordinating axioms of old physics are the axioms of ge-
ometry; Maxwell’s equations are an example of connecting axioms.
[HR 026-03-01, 56 bis]41
Now, the Zuordnungsaxiome represent the possibility that the general proper-
ties of all bodies be reduced to a minimum of propositions. Here, the coordinating
axioms are in fact entitled to deal with the properties of bodies. The system of
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equations is the general framework in which the connection among real things is
actually achieved. Or better, this system represent the more general framework
into which things have to be cast if they have to be thought of as real. This is an
interesting specification, for above all it does not primarily associate the coordina-
tion directly with the idea that we saw at play in the dissertation, that is, the idea
of “merely” representing a bridge between the formal structures and the real ones.
Let’s briefly summarise what we have seen so far. In the doctoral thesis, the
coordination was carried out by means of the notion of approximation. Formal
structures could describe physical structures only by way of a certain approxima-
tion. The principle of probability was the tool Reichenbach implemented in order
to treat the issue of approximation in formal terms and thus fill the gap between
the two structures.
In (1920), the situation is complicated by the fact that not only is a principle
of probability required in the same sense of the doctoral thesis, but there are also
several other principles of the coordination (i.e., application) of these mathemati-
cal structures that are not strictly speaking related to the principle of probability.
Some of these principles are, for instance, the axioms of arithmetic, which are
presupposed as rules of connection in the equations of gravitation, as well as in
allowing for the representation of certain physical relations by means of mathe-
matical objects. This is the case of physical forces that we identify as vectors,
for instance. It must be emphasised, though, that even if a number of other ax-
ioms of coordination can be isolated within the scientific construction, they also
necessarily presuppose the principle of probability at a higher level, as the ulti-
mate principle of the effective representation of material objects in any formal
(mathematical) expressions.
In my reading, probability is a meta-constitutive, coordinating axiom for it
enables the other axioms of coordination to really perform the coordination of
certain structures, like space and time, or the axioms of arithmetic, to real things
(objects). Beside the principle of probability, the principle of genidentity also
appears to be “more constitutive” than other constitutive principles. In fact, before
deciding to coordinate whatever formal structure to the unformed reality in order
to constitute the object, an evident requirement is that this object persists over
time as the same object. The idea behind both principles is that each eventually
supplies some very general tool for the conceptual identification that is called for
when applying formal structures to reality.
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4.2 Axioms of Connection, Axioms of Order and Axioms of
Coordination
Earlier I mentioned that in the original manuscript of The Theory of Relativity and
A Priori Knowledge a distinction of axioms in terms of connection and coordi-
nation was introduced by Reichenbach only later in revisions. Moreover, among
Reichenbach’s manuscripts and various drafts for Axiomatik (1924), there is ev-
idence of a later attempt to clarify and further elaborate on this question in an
unpublished short paper entitled “Der Begriff des Apriori und seine Wandlung
durch die Relativita¨tstheorie” (The Concept of A Priori and Its Transformation
through Relativity Theory).42 There, Reichenbach returns to Hilbert’s terminol-
ogy of the Grundlagen, now distinguishing three different kinds of axioms: beside
the previous two, he adds a third kind, the axioms of order (Axiome der Ordnung).
These axioms share exactly the same features with the axioms of coordina-
tion. They are both constitutive a priori in the revised Kantian sense of (1920),
they are fallible (as is the distinction among axioms itself) and theory-specific.
Unfortunately, this interesting distinction is only outlined in the paper, and Rei-
chenbach does not expressly formulate the new axioms, but they clearly tend to
be assimilated into the process of constituting a framework in which the represen-
tation of real things can in principle be embedded. However, these new axioms,
which are placed between the connecting and the coordinating axioms, need to be
supplemented by the axioms of coordination.
Let us follow Reichenbach’s manuscript and start with the axioms of connec-
tion. They are again characterised in the same way we have seen so far, namely as
special laws of physics. These axioms describe special relations, more specifically
laws of experience (Erfahrungsgesetze). That is, they define individual things
(Einzeldinge).
The axioms of coordination and of order do not define individual things, but
rather determine more generally what the object (Gegenstand) is. For instance,
“the probability function determines identity.” This is to be understood in the
same terms we have seen before, i.e., physical magnitudes can be represented
by the same value resulting from different empirical data by virtue of the proba-
bility function. The constitutive axioms also specify the measurable relations of
the objects that lead to the connection. In this, he continues, they constitute the
physical, therefore measurable object. So it is right to say that the phenomena
(Dinge qua Erscheinungen) conform to our thought. But this does not exclude the
converse, namely that our thought is directed by them. That is why the special
form of the coordinating and ordering axioms has to be modified when they no
longer can ground the representation of our experience.43
In this manuscript, Reichenbach basically formulates a number of questions
and sketches only a few answers. Despite the lack of a further elaboration, this
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text shows that the classical distinction in terms of coordinating and connecting
axioms has to be construed differently from the way it is generally understood in
the secondary literature. Interestingly, he asks: “How is cognition as coordination
of fictitious magnitudes to reality possible? And how is the ordering of these mag-
nitudes possible?” According to Reichenbach, only insofar as we make specific
presuppositions about the coordination and the ordering can we define what an
identical and real object is, and how it can be related to other things. Further,
What is a real law in this framework? A real law is what remains
invariant under coordinate transformations. What does measurability
mean? Measurability means to assign an arbitrary order within the
coordinates. A real thing is what appears in such laws as magnitude
and that is measured according to these laws. [HR 024-15-02]44
Thus, there are two layers of constitutivity to be differentiated. Accordingly,
the fundamental question regarding knowledge is to be answered on two levels.
Cognition means, on the one hand, the coordination of certain fictitious magni-
tudes to reality and, on the other, the act of ordering these magnitudes within a
specified structure. In the cognitive process, the real thing is what appears as
magnitude within—and is measured according to—specific laws. But measuring
requires a pre-constituted order. This order, in turn, acquires its meaning only
by being coordinated to actual objects that can be identified according to certain
ultimate principles. Therefore, in this unpublished manuscript, the cognitive com-
ponent in the process of knowledge is deployed first by creating a determinate
modality for ordering, and then by coordinating the ordered structure to actual
things (or also, by extension, to events), i.e., things (or events) that can be recog-
nised as that specific individual thing (or event).
In other words, here the Axiome der Zuordnung are concerned with stating
what can be isolated and identified as the “real” to be ordered in the flux of per-
ception. This ordering is possible only insofar as we have a framework in which
the “real” can be inserted. This is not to be understood as the set of physical laws,
but as the framework enabling these laws to be conceived. As in the example
given in this manuscript, which Reichenbach also employed in (1920), space and
time are not characterised by and within the laws of physics, but rather provide
the framework in which it is in principle possible to identify real things with the
addition of the laws of physics. In the same sense, the axioms of arithmetic re-
ferring to the vectors are presupposed when we treat the force as a mathematical
vector.
But the final step in the coordination to reality is performed by way of another
kind of coordinating principles. Before, I suggested that in the 1920 account there
are two coordinating principles that appear to be more significant than others,
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namely the principle of genidentity and the principle of probability. These are
clearly to be located at the level of the coordinating principles of the account that
Reichenbach sketches on this occasion. The idea of the two-level co-ordination is
confirmed by this manuscript, where the two constitutive moments are separated
according to the two different functions they embody and serve in cognition.
4.3 A Conventionalist Shift?
After the correspondence with Schlick and his consequent “conventionalist shift”,
around the end of 1920, Reichenbach no longer talks about constitutive principles.
The first development of this discussion is apparent in a report that he deliv-
ered at the Deutsche Physikertag in Jena, in September 1921, on his plan to ax-
iomatise relativity theory.45 The fundamental methodological innovation of this
short paper is to present an axiomatisation in which the starting point consists of
making use of axioms that can ideally make direct contact with empirical (or ex-
perimentally testable) facts, and of complementing them by introducing a number
of coordinative definitions for the construction of the conceptual content of the
theory.46
In his second monograph on relativity theory, the Axiomatik (1924), Reichen-
bach emphasises the importance of this novel approach, that it makes a clear-cut
separation between the conventional component (the coordinative definitions) and
the empirical, factual one (the empirical axioms). In fact, the axiomatisation has
to be primarily based on observable facts, and it is only from these facts that the
abstract conceptualisation will derive. For this approach Reichenbach now coins
the expression “constructive axiomatisation”,47 a clear development of the regres-
sive method—the wissenschaftsanalytische Methode—defined in (1920).
Despite the sharp distinction between definitions and axioms, in the Axiomatik,
the principle of probability, in the form of the principle of induction (or of in-
ductive simplicity), nevertheless finds a peculiar position under the general name
of “epistemological principles”, i.e., principles presupposed by any factual state-
ments:
One of [these principles] is the assumption that the experiment, if
subsequently repeated, will always yield the same result, the assump-
tion of causality. Furthermore, the principle of induction is presup-
posed; for instance, certain values of measurement will be connected
by a simple curve and this curve will be called an empirical law. [Rei-
chenbach (1924/1969), 5]
As is well known, all these issues will maintain a focal position in Reichen-
bach’s philosophical system. Let me just recall that as far as the principle of
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genidentity is concerned, Reichenbach no longer mentions it in his (1924). How-
ever, this principle is in the background of his causal theory of time, even though
Reichenbach will explicitly re-acknowledge its importance only in The Philoso-
phy of Space and Time (1928). There, he describes it as a very deep principle of
our natural knowledge (ein sehr tiefes Prinzip der Naturerkenntnis), an empiri-
cal but absolutely essential principle of time order.48 What is meant by simply
claiming that genidentity is an empirical principle is not really clear. Neither does
Reichenbach seem to solve the issue in his posthumous The Direction of Time
(1956), where this principle still plays a crucial, and actually constitutive, role.
But I shall leave this discussion for another occasion.
To return to the question of Reichenbach’s shift towards conventionalism, now
we can ask: to what sorts of assertion is this shift to be applied? Let us take
the classic example of the coordinative definition represented by the concept of
length unit elaborated in his 1924 axiomatisation. This concept is a mathematical
one, and it states that “a certain particular interval is to serve as [standard of]
comparison for other intervals.” The physical definition, to the contrary, needs to
be able to project, as it were, the mathematical concept onto the unformed reality.
But being coordinative, and thus conventional, such a definition is also arbitrary.
In our example, it is represented by the designator of the Paris standard meter
as the unit of length. This definition clearly presupposes the mathematical one.
Therefore, he continues, physical (or coordinative) definitions are kinds of real
definitions that coordinate a mathematical definition to a “piece of reality.” Since
the coordination must be univocal, the necessary requirements for this purpose are
given by the axioms.49
According to what we have seen above, we can regard the axioms of order
of the unpublished manuscript as the coordinative definitions of the constructive
axiomatisation. The main feature that Reichenbach assigns them in that paper is
that they determine the measurable relations that lead to the connection (that is,
to a possible empirical law). Reichenbach also adds that measurability means to
attribute an arbitrary order within the coordinates. Already in The Theory of Rela-
tivity and A Priori Knowledge, Reichenbach refers to the classical example of the
length of a physical rod as “defined by a large number of physical equations that
are interpreted as ‘length’ with the help of readings on geodetic instruments.”50
To conclude, in (1920) there are clearly coordinating principles that are, as
it were, constitutive of the constitutive principles. These cannot be turned into
conventions, as is the case of probability. Although the spirit of Reichenbach’s
constructive axiomatisation is oriented towards a conventionalist stance, the con-
ventions only apply so far as a theory-specific package is concerned. In fact, his
alleged conventionalist shift concerns only the Axiome der Ordnung, but not all
constitutive axioms.
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5 Relativizing the Relativized A Priori
What consequences can be drawn from this new reading? If my interpretation
of the two-level constitutive account of Reichenbach’s principles of knowledge is
correct, the relativized a priori needs to be relativized in turn. In Reichenbach’s
model, the constitutive order axioms can be turned into coordinative definitions
(still holding an a priori status), whereas other (meta)-constitutive coordinating
principles, such as probability and genidentity, are relativized, or even “abso-
lutised”, and turned into different assumptions in his later works. Although an
attempt to provide a firmer axiomatic footing to the set of principles of knowledge
is inscribed in Reichenbach’s empiricist tendency, he will not be able to do away
with these two assumptions. He will try to provide a different kind of justification
for probability, but he will uncritically assume genidentity simply based on the
motivation that things would not be conceivable otherwise.
This is not the place to start a discussion on the possible implications of a two-
level account of the constitutive, relativized a priori, but this tripartite distinction
among axioms could be helpful in developing a more structured framework. As
in Reichenbach’s account, a double layer of a priori could be envisaged, namely
a set of more fundamental constitutive principles that should appear to be valid
for scientific objects at the most general level, together with some subsets of other
constitutive principles, which would themselves depend in turn on the most fun-
damental ones. These subsets would be specific to and would function in the
special sciences they would have to be applied to. In conjunction with these, other
sub-subsets of connecting axioms could be thought of in terms of individual laws
pertaining to each specific domain of science.
The current debate over the possibility of maintaining some form of constitu-
tive principles in the early Reichenbachian fashion should benefit from this lesson,
and should, moreover, take account of the fact that the constitutive principles are
not only different among themselves horizontally, or from a qualitative point of
view, but should also be structured within themselves, as it were, vertically.
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Notes
1Cf. Reichenbach (1935), (1936b) and (1937).
2Cf. Reichenbach’s address in the section on logical empiricism at the famous Paris Congress
of 1935, (1936a), as well as his (1936c).
3Reichenbach (1920). This text was presented by Reichenbach as “Habilitationsschrift” to
obtain the qualification for university teaching under the formal supervision of Erich Regener,
physics professor at the “Technische Hochschule” of Stuttgart.
4Reichenbach was one of the first five students attending Einstein’s lectures on general and
special relativity, and on statistical mechanics in Berlin, between 1917 and 1920. His notebooks,
like all the original material from the Hans Reichenbach Collection (HR) that I will quote in the
next sections, are available at the Pittsburgh Archives of Scientific Philosophy, and they can be
found in the folder HR 028-01-01/05.
5Reichenbach (1916).
6For a synopsis of Reichenbach’s dissertation, see Eberhardt’s “Reliability via Synthetic A
Priori – Reichenbach’s Doctoral Thesis on Probability”, in this same volume.
7Here, I only deal with the way these two principles interact in the process of cognitive coor-
dination, not much with the question of their foundation. In particular, as far as the principle of
probability is concerned, Reichenbach provides a justification that he reckons to be in line with
the one Kant employed for the principle of causality, that is, a “transcendental deduction”. Cf.
Reichenbach (1916/2008), 105 ff.
8Reichenbach (1916/2008), 125–129.
9For more details on these issues see again Eberhardt’s contribution to this volume.
10There are several elements that would suggest that the principle of probability, as Reichenbach
formulated it in 1915, cannot simply be placed beside that of causality. There, probability plays
in fact a dual role: as a synthetic a priori principle, it serves to capture specific features of reality
that cannot be subsumed under the principle of causality, and to give their representation for the
subject; yet, the principle of probability is not only important from an “ontological” point of view,
but also from a more methodological one. On the one hand, the principle of probability appears to
be formulated in “causal” terms, namely in the treatment of causally dependent and independent
trials. On the other hand, probability is the most fundamental tool allowing each natural science
to account for real events, and in this very sense it is presupposed by causality itself, making it
ultimately rely on probability.
11Despite Reichenbach’s Kantian terminology, in his work there is a tension in relation to the
Kantian system: the principle of probability seems to suggest the statistical character of the laws of
nature, and this would implicitly mean discarding the deterministic idea that is behind Kant’s fun-
damental principle of causality. This is in fact the direction that Reichenbach will take—with some
vacillation—after the publication of his doctoral thesis. This tension in Reichenbach’s originally
“Kantian” intentions has been already emphasised by Milic Cˇapek long ago. As he remarked,
“from [Kant’s] point of view, it is meaningless to claim that empirical reality is “rationally in-
exhaustible” and that the mathematical structure fits the observed data only loosely. [. . . ] [T]o
postulate a special a priori status for the principle of statistical distribution, as Reichenbach did,
was thoroughly un-Kantian.” Cˇapek (1958), 88–90.
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12As Reichenbach makes clear, “it is precisely the task of experience to establish which are
the important influences and which others may be neglected. Naturally, this experience can only
be obtained by measurements; they establish whether the theoretically calculated numbers are
anywhere close to the numbers occurring in reality. [. . . ] Hence, physical experience consists
in the establishment of a numerical approximation by experiment, and conversely the physical
principle assures by virtue of experience the approximate validity of certain numbers for a class of
natural events.” Reichenbach (1916/2008), 123–125.
13See Richardson (1998), ch. 5, and Ryckman (1991).
14Cf. Ryckman (1991), 61 ff.
15On all these issues, see Friedman (2005), 72 ff.
16Cassirer (1910/1923), 269.
17In Cassirer’s words: “Erst wenn wir begriffen haben, dass dieselben Grundsynthesen, auf de-
nen Logik und Mathematik beruhren, auch den wissenschaftlichen Aufbau der Erfahrungserken-
ntnis beherrschen, dass erst sie es uns ermo¨glichen, von einer festen gesetzlichen Ordnung unter
Erscheinungen und somit von ihrer gegensta¨ndlichen Bedeutung zu sprechen. Erst dann ist die
wahre Rechtfertigung der Prinzipien erreicht.” Cassirer (1907), 44–45.
18Cf. Cassirer (1910/1923), 265 ff.
19And indeed, Reichenbach acknowledged the common approach in both writings, as he under-
lines in his (1920/1965), 75: “The author was able to carry through such an analysis for a special
domain of physics, for the theory of probability. It led to the discovery of an axiom that has fun-
damental significance for our understanding of physics, and as a principle of distribution finds its
place next to causality, a principle of connection.”
20The English edition quite freely translates it with “method of successive approximations.”
21Reichenbach attended Cassirer’s lectures on German idealism in the winter semester 1913–
1914, while he was enrolled at the University of Berlin. In the bibliographic references to his
(1916), Reichenbach only mentions Cassirer (1910), so it is not clear whether he was familiar also
with his (1907).
22This is an element that comes into his account after studying Schlick (1918).
23Reichenbach (1920/1965), 34–35.
24That there is a limit to the arbitrariness of physical coordination is a crucial point that Rei-
chenbach will keep emphasising also later, to characterise his account with respect to the con-
ventionalists’. See especially his correspondence with Schlick, which I mention below, footnote
3.2.
25Reichenbach (1920/1965), 44.
26To be sure, this expression was coined by Michael Friedman. Cf. his (1999), ch. 3, and
references therein.
27Reichenbach (1920/1965), 48.
28Reichenbach (1920/1965), 48. Cf. Cassirer (1910/1923), 269: “A cognition is called a priori
not in any sense as if it were prior to experience, but because and in so far as it is contained
as a necessary premise in every valid judgment concerning facts.” [emphasis in the original] As
Ryckman notices, “with this modication, the way is open towards viewing, as do Poincare´, Schlick,
Einstein and Reichenbach, conventions as having the logical status of a priori elements.” Ryckman
(1991), 85.
29Incidentally, some features assigned to causality in the dissertation are now integrated into the
notion of probability, as we shall see, for instance, below at p. 18. As I briefly indicated in footnote
2.1, in Reichenbach’s writings of the late 1920s, and especially in those of the 1930s, probability,
instead of completing the principle of causality, will end up simply founding it, and causality will
be expressed in probabilistic terms, like in (1925b)—this in opposition to the approach displayed
22
in the dissertation, where probability was first defined on the basis of causally dependent and
independent trials.
30This exchange consists of five letters, in the order: HR 015-63-23, Schlick to Reichenbach,
25 September 1920; Reichenbach to Schlick, 17 October 1920 (in the Schlick Collection at the
Wiener Kreis Stichting, Amsterdam); HR 015-63-22, Schlick to Reichenbach, 26 November 1920;
HR 015-63-20, Reichenbach to Schlick, 29 November 1920; HR 015-63-19, Schlick to Reichen-
bach, 11 December 1920. This correspondence has been largely referred to and analysed in the
secondary literature. Just to mention a few, see Coffa (1991), 201–206; Hentschel (1990), 507
ff.; Friedman (1999), 62–65; Ryckman (2005), 51 ff. Further, this exchange is also mentioned
by Schlick in his (1921) and by Reichenbach in his (1922a). All these letters are now entirely
available at http://echo.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/content/modernphysics/reichenbach1920-22.
31The paper was emblematically entitled “Die Axiomatik der modernen Physik”—an idea that
the young Reichenbach certainly found fascinating.
32In his paper, Haas presents a survey of the axioms of physics (i.e., the axioms of connection)
that he reckons complete. But although Reichenbach welcomes this classification, in footnote 15 to
p. 54 he criticises Haas for not seeing the necessity of introducing physical axioms of coordination.
Cf. Reichenbach (1920/1965), 111.
33See also above, footnote 3.1.
34Reichenbach (1920/1965), 53.
35Reichenbach (1920/1965), 54–55.
36Lewin (1922).
37This principle will play an important part in both his (1928) and (1956). See below, p. 18.
38Friedman (1999), 60 ff.
39Reichenbach (1920/1965), 100. See Friedman (1999), 66, for his reading of Reichenbach’s
account of theory change according to this scheme. Friedman’s own account of mathematical-
physical theories has a tripartite structure (a mathematical, a mechanical and a proper physical-
empirical part) and is partly shaped by Reichenbach’s. See his (2001), 79–80.
40Cf. his autobiographical notes of October 1927, HR 044-06-23.
41“Man kann die Einzelgesetze unter sich in ein deduktives System bringen, sodass sie alle
als Folgerungen einiger weniger Grundgleichungen erscheinen. Wir wollen diese, da sie die
Verknu¨pfung der einzelnen physikalischen Gro¨ssen angeben, als Verknu¨pfungsaxiome bezeich-
nen; wir stellen sie zu den Zuordnungsaxiomen gegenu¨ber, welche die allgemeinen Eigenschaften
aller Ko¨rper, auf ein Minimum von Sa¨tzen reduziert, darstellen. Ein Beispiel fu¨r Zuordnungsax-
iome der alten Physik sind die Axiome der Geometrie, fu¨r Verknu¨pfungsaxiome die Maxwellschen
Gleichungen.” HR 026-03-01, 56 bis.
42HR 024-15-02.
43In his words: “Es gibt: Axiome der Zuordnung, der Ordnung, der Verknu¨pfung. Die V.[erknu¨p-
fungs]A.[xiome] sind die spez. Gesetze der Physik, z. B. Rik− 12 gikR= Tik. Sie geben nur die spez.
Relationen, Erfahrungsgesetze. (Definieren die Einzeldinge). Die beiden ersten sind apriori. D.h.
nichts zeitliches: es hat keinen Sinn zu sagen, dass sie sich nicht a¨ndern. [. . . ] Ihre spez. Form ist
durch den Stand unserer Erfahrung bestimmt. [. . . ] Aber: sie bestimmen welches der Gegenstand
ist (W[ahrscheinlichkeits]f[un]kt[ion] bestimmt Identita¨t), und welches die messbaren Relationen
des Gegenstands sind, die zur Verknu¨pfung fu¨hren (ds2 =). Sie konstituieren den physikalisch
messbaren Gegenstand. Darum ist es richtig, dass sich die Dinge (d. Erscheinung) nach un-
serem Denken richten. Aber das schliesst die Umkehrung nicht aus: dass sich unser Denken
nach den Dingen richtet. Vielmehr werden wir die spez. Form der Z.[uordnungs]A.[xiome] und
O.[rdnungs]A.[xiome] a¨ndern, sowie wir damit die Erfahrung nicht mehr darstellen ko¨nnen.” HR
024-15-02.
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44“Frage: Wie ist die Erkenntnis als Zuordnung von fikt.[iven] Gro¨ssen zur Wirklichkeit und als
Ordnung dieser Gro¨ssen mo¨glich? Antwort: Nur dadurch, dass man bestimmte Vorauss.[etzungen]
fu¨r die Zuordnung und die Ordnung macht, welche definieren, was ein identische[r], reale[r]
Gegenstand ist und wie e[r] mit andern Dingen in Relation gebracht werden kann. [. . . ] Die
Relativita¨tstheorie hat gezeigt, dass apriore Sa¨tze wandelbar sind. Aber sie hat das nicht in jener
flachen Form vollzogen wie die Empiristen, die da sagen ‘alles ist Erfahrung’, sondern sie hat eine
wirkliche Wandlung des Gegenstandsbegriffes vollzogen. Reales Gesetz ist das, was invariant ist
gegen Tr[ansformation] d. Koord[inaten]. Messbarkeit heisst beliebige Ordnung innerhalb d. Ko-
ord[inaten]. Wirkliches Ding ist das, was in solchen Gesetzen als Gro¨sse auftritt u. nach solchen
Gesetzen gemessen wird.” HR 024-15-02.
45Reichenbach (1921).
46Reichenbach (1921/2006), 45.
47As he elucidates, “the constructive axiomatisation is more in line with physics than is a deduc-
tive one, because it serves to carry out the primary aim of physics, the description of the physical
world.” Reichenbach (1924/1969), 5.
48As he explains in 1928, this principle “enables us to speak of a unique time order and a unique
now-point. Furthermore, it makes possible the concept of the individual that remains identical
during the passage of time. It is therefore the most important axiom regarding time order, and
we realize to what an extent the familiar concept of time order is based on this characteristic of
causality. Of course, this axiom is a result of experience [es ist klar, daß es sich in diesem Axiom
um einen Erfahrungssatz handeln kann].” Reichenbach (1928/1958), 142–143.
49Or, as he writes, “are derived from the facts laid down by the axioms.” Cf. Reichenbach
(1969), 7–9.
50Reichenbach (1920/1965), 40.
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